A victim statement may fail as a dying declaration but still be admitted as res gestae if made immediately after the attack before fabrication was possible.

A victim’s statement identifying the shooter is not automatically admissible as a dying declaration; but if made immediately after the attack, before there is time to fabricate a story, it may still be received as part of the res gestae. For accused persons, complainants, and families in criminal cases, People v. Laquinon is a reminder that courts look not only at labels like dying declaration, but at the timing, spontaneity, and surrounding circumstances of the statement.

Why This Ruling Matters in Criminal Litigation

Many criminal cases turn on what a wounded victim said in the critical moments after an attack. Families often believe that a victim’s last words are automatically enough to convict. Accused persons, on the other hand, may assume that if the victim did not expressly say he was about to die, the statement must be excluded. The ruling in Laquinon occupies the more careful middle ground.

The Court held that the statement attributed to Pablo Remonde could not be admitted as a dying declaration because the record did not show that he believed himself to be in extremis, or at the point of death when every hope of recovery had disappeared. That belief is the foundation for admitting dying declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule. Yet the statement was not useless. Because it was made immediately after the shooting, while the incident was still fresh and before there was sufficient time to invent a charge, the Court treated it as part of the res gestae.

Background of the Shooting and Trial

Gregorio Laquinon, alias Jolly, was charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur for the killing of Pablo Remonde. The trial court found him guilty of murder, imposed reclusion perpetua, ordered indemnity to the heirs, and required payment of costs. Laquinon appealed from the judgment (G.R. No. L-45470, February 28, 1985).

The prosecution’s account was that on the evening of November 13, 1972, barrio captain Samma But heard gunshots from the riverbank. He called others to proceed to the area. They found Remonde lying on the sand with his hands tied behind his back and his leg tied down. When asked who shot him, Remonde identified Laquinon as the person who ran for councilor under the Liberal local election ticket and son of Suelo Maravillas, although he also said he did not know whether he would survive.

Remonde was later brought to a hospital, underwent surgery, and died days later because of bullet wounds. Laquinon denied killing him and claimed that another person, Cabardo, committed the shooting. The trial court rejected this defense, and the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction with modification as to civil indemnity.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, …

The Doctrine: Not Every Victim Statement Is a Dying Declaration

The Court’s first important point is technical but powerful: a dying declaration is admissible only when the declarant made the statement under consciousness of impending death. It is not enough that the declarant eventually died. It is not enough that the injury was serious. It must appear that, at the time of the statement, the victim believed death was near and hope of recovery was gone.

Here, Remonde’s statement did not qualify. He was asked whether he would survive and answered that he did not know. That answer showed uncertainty, not the settled belief of impending death required for a dying declaration. For litigants, this matters because courts will not relax the hearsay rule simply because the declarant later died. Counsel must establish the victim’s state of mind at the time the statement was made.

But the Statement Was Still Admissible as Res Gestae

The Court’s second point is the practical heart of the ruling. Even if the statement failed as a dying declaration, it could be admitted as part of the res gestae. A res gestae statement is admissible when it is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the startling event itself, before the speaker has time to reflect, calculate, or fabricate.

In Laquinon, the victim’s statement was made immediately after the shooting. The victim was still at the scene, bound, wounded, and responding to urgent questions about who had shot him. The Court reasoned that he had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused. This made the statement sufficiently spontaneous to be considered as part of the occurrence itself.

Treachery and the Manner of Attack

The Court also affirmed that the killing was murder qualified by treachery. Treachery exists when the offender employs means of execution that directly and specially insure the attack without risk to himself from any defense the victim might make. The facts found by the Court showed that Remonde’s hands were tied at his back when he was shot, leaving him unable to defend himself.

The physical evidence also undermined the defense theory. The Court noted that the accused’s version was difficult to reconcile with the direction and nature of the gunshot wounds. It also found the alternative accusation against Cabardo unpersuasive, especially because the supposed circumstances of the shooting did not fit the medical evidence and the broader narrative accepted by the trial court.

What This Means for Accused Persons and Complainants

For accused persons, the ruling shows that excluding a statement under one hearsay exception does not necessarily exclude it entirely. A statement may fail as a dying declaration but still come in under another evidentiary doctrine if the facts support admissibility. Defense counsel must therefore challenge not only the label used by the prosecution, but also the factual basis for spontaneity, timing, perception, and reliability.

For complainants and families of victims, the case shows why early, accurate, and well-documented statements matter. The identity of the declarant, the exact words used, the time between the incident and the statement, the condition of the victim, and the persons present may determine whether the statement is admitted or excluded.

For trial lawyers, Laquinon is a useful reminder that criminal cases are won or lost on evidence foundations. The prosecution must prove why an out-of-court statement fits an exception to the hearsay rule. The defense must test whether the exception truly applies. Courts, in turn, are not bound by the parties’ preferred characterization if another admissibility route is supported by the record.

Practical Guidance from Ablola, Saribong & Gueco

Criminal litigation often turns on the admissibility of statements made in moments of crisis. Whether you are defending an accused, assisting a complainant, or evaluating the strength of a criminal case, the evidentiary classification of a victim’s statement can affect the entire outcome.

Ablola, Saribong & Gueco advises clients in criminal defense, private prosecution, evidence assessment, and appeals. For case strategy, trial preparation, or appellate review involving eyewitness testimony, victim statements, treachery, alibi, or hearsay objections, visit MakatiLawFirm.com to consult with our litigation team.


Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *