CAAP personnel who merely flew as passengers were ordered to refund flying risk pay, while good-faith approving officers escaped solidary liability.
Government personnel cannot claim flying risk pay merely because their official duties require them to ride airplanes. The allowance belongs only to aviation personnel whose actual functions involve regular and frequent aerial operations, not officials who travel as passengers to attend meetings, inspect facilities, or perform administrative work. For agencies, government-owned or controlled corporations, and employees facing Commission on Audit disallowances, the ruling draws a sharp line between lawful hazard-based compensation and unauthorized travel-related benefits.
Why This Ruling Matters to Public Officers and GOCC Employees
Allowances in government are often justified by custom, internal resolutions, or prior administrative practice. This case makes clear that those justifications are not enough when the benefit is tied to a specific statutory purpose. Flying risk pay is not a general perk for personnel who take official flights. It is a risk-based allowance meant to compensate those whose duties expose them to hazards peculiar to aircraft operation and flight missions.
The practical consequence is significant. Even where a disbursement was approved by agency leadership and supported by a plausible legal interpretation at the time, the employees who received the money may still have to refund it if they were not legally entitled to the benefit. At the same time, approving and certifying officers may avoid solidary liability when they acted in good faith and relied on a reasonable interpretation of law or a prior COA ruling.
Background: CAAP Flying Risk Pay Was Paid to Officials and Personnel Who Traveled on Official Business
The case involved officers and employees of the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines who questioned a COA disallowance of flying risk pay paid for 2011 in the total amount of PHP 323,579.50. The controversy reached the Supreme Court in Concordia S. Pagkaliwangan, Alex B. Balde, and other CAAP officers and employees v. Commission on Audit (G.R. No. 272465).
The payments were based on a CAAP board resolution and authority order allowing flying risk pay to qualified personnel who rendered at least four hours of flight per month. The recipients included officials and employees whose trips involved airport inspections, conferences, meetings, project oversight, legal verification, safety inspections, and related official engagements. COA disallowed the payments because the positions of the recipients were not among those authorized in the DBM-approved Corporate Operating Budget and because their functions were not the kind of aerial or flight duties contemplated by law.
The Supreme Court’s Doctrine: Flying Risk Pay Requires Flight-Related Duties, Not Mere Air Travel
The Supreme Court upheld the disallowance. It held that Section 30 of the Civil Aeronautics Act confines flying risk pay to two groups: rated or licensed airmen, and other authorized personnel who are required to undertake or perform regular and frequent aerial flights in connection with their duties. The decisive condition is functional. The employee’s own duties must require participation in aerial operations or exposure to flight-related hazards.
The Court rejected the broader view that any authorized CAAP personnel could receive flying risk pay so long as they completed the required monthly flight hours. The phrase “such other authorized personnel” could not be read in isolation. Applying the rule of noscitur a sociis, the Court read that phrase in relation to “airmen,” meaning that the other authorized personnel must perform duties similar in character to those of aviation personnel directly involved in aircraft operation, navigation, inspection, maintenance, dispatch, air traffic control, or related flight safety functions.
The Government Accounting and Auditing Manual reinforced this interpretation. It restricts flying risk pay to personnel performing duties inherent in aircraft operation while in flight, and expressly excludes passengers as such. In practical terms, a government official who boards a commercial or official flight to reach a meeting or inspection site is not thereby performing an aerial mission.
Why the Payments Were Disallowed
The Court found that the CAAP officials and employees who received the disallowed payments were performing managerial, administrative, financial, inspection, legal, or support functions. Their air travel may have been legitimate, official, and necessary, but it was merely incidental to their responsibilities. They boarded aircraft to reach destinations; they were not flying as part of the aircraft’s assigned mission.
The Court also considered the DBM-approved Corporate Operating Budget for 2011, which specifically identified positions eligible for flying risk pay. Those positions were tied to aircraft accident investigation, flight inspection and calibration, flight standards, airworthiness, flight operations, licensing and certification, airmen examination, flight surgery, and air traffic service. The exclusion of purely administrative or managerial positions supported COA’s view that the benefit was limited to personnel exposed to flight-related hazards.
Good Faith Protected Approving Officers, But Not the Payees
The ruling is especially important because the Supreme Court separated the liability of approving and certifying officers from the liability of recipients. The disallowance was valid, but the approving and certifying officers were absolved from solidary liability. They acted in good faith because, at the time the 2011 payments were made, there was no Supreme Court precedent squarely interpreting the provision, and a prior COA decision had lifted a similar disallowance under a more expansive reading of the law.
Under the Madera rules on return, approving and certifying officers who acted in good faith, in the regular performance of official functions, and with the diligence of a good father of a family are not civilly liable to refund the disallowed amount. A reasonable textual interpretation of the law and the absence of controlling contrary precedent may support good faith.
The payees, however, remained individually liable to return the amounts they actually received. The Court applied solutio indebiti and unjust enrichment. Because the recipients were not legally entitled to flying risk pay, and because the benefit was not merely procedurally defective but substantively unauthorized, they could not keep the payments simply because they received them in good faith.
Practical Impact for Government Agencies, GOCCs, and Employees Facing COA Disallowances
The ruling gives agencies a concrete compliance lesson: internal resolutions cannot expand statutory benefits beyond their legal purpose. When an allowance is tied to hazard, risk, technical duty, or a specific statutory class, the agency must document that the recipient’s actual functions fall within that class. It is not enough that the travel or work was official, necessary, or beneficial to the agency.
For government employees, the case is a warning that receiving an approved benefit does not always mean the money is safe from refund. Good faith may protect approving officers from solidary liability, but recipients may still be ordered to return amounts that had no legal basis. Employees who receive unusual allowances should ask whether the benefit is supported by statute, budget authorization, and a direct connection between the allowance and their actual duties.
For approving and certifying officers, the ruling shows the importance of preserving legal bases, budget documents, certifications, prior administrative rulings, and legal opinions. These may become crucial evidence of good faith if COA later issues a notice of disallowance. The presence of a reasonable legal interpretation can be the difference between personal solidary liability and absolution.
How Ablola, Saribong & Gueco Can Help
COA disallowances, government compensation disputes, and refund liabilities require careful handling because the legal consequences may fall differently on approving officers, certifying officers, and payees. Ablola, Saribong & Gueco assists public officers, GOCCs, contractors, and affected personnel in evaluating notices of disallowance, preparing appeals, assessing refund exposure, and developing compliance frameworks for public fund disbursements.
If your agency, office, or organization is dealing with a COA disallowance, questioned allowance, audit observation, or refund demand, visit MakatiLawFirm.com to consult with Ablola, Saribong & Gueco on your available remedies and risk-mitigation options.